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Myrick: Peer-to-Peer and Substantial Noninfringing Use: Giving the Term "

PEER-TO-PEER AND SUBSTANTIAL
NONINFRINGING USE: GIVING THE TERM
"SUBSTANTIAL" SOME MEANING
On September 8, 2003, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) filed lawsuits against 261 defendants alleging that these individuals had
infringed the copyrights of RIAA members through the use of peer-to-peer
networks, also known as P2P. By September 9, 2003, the first of these lawsuits
settled-for around $2,000-largely as a result of the public outrage after it was
revealed that this suit had targeted a twelve-year old honors student living in a
New York city housing project.' Since then, the industry has filed over 7,000
lawsuits against individual file sharers using a variety of peer-to-peer services. 2
These lawsuits are largely the result of a ruling against the industry in the Ninth
Circuit that has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pursue
contributory infringement claims against the software providers who make file
sharing possible.3 The Metro-Golduyn-MayerStudios Inc. v. Grokster4 ruling put the
Ninth Circuit in conflict with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in In reAimster Copyright
Li''gations and set the stage for the Supreme Court to grant the recording
industry's petition for a writ of certiorari in the Grokster 1l litigation on December
10, 2004.6 Ideally, the Supreme Court will produce a decision that brings much
needed clarification to this recurring problem.
Part I of this Note will briefly examine the architecture of a variety of peer-topeer file sharing networks in order to explain the different results in contributory

' Jefferson Graham, RL4A Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos,USA TODAY, Sept. 10,2003, at
4D.
2

Jefferson Graham, Record Labels Cut Deals with File-SharingCompanies, USA TODAY, Dec. 3,

2004, at 3B.
3 Mike France, Striking Back, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 2003, at 94. France states:
Before taking teenagers to court, the RIAA also wanted to see if it could stop the
problem by shutting down Web sites that facilitated piracy. Though lawyers shut
down Napster in July, 2001, other peer-to-peer networks carefully designed to
skirt the law, such as Morpheus and Grokster, quickly rose up in its wake. The
industry sued the second-generation pirate sites in October, 2001, and was
expecting a similar result in court. But on Apr. 25, 2003, a federal judge in Los
Angeles ruled that Morpheus and Grokster could remain open. The devastating
ruling meant that it would be impossible to kill music web sites in court, leaving
the industry with only one legal option: suing consumers.
4 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1244 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Grokster1].

' In reAimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (7th Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Aimster Ii].
6 GroksterII, 380 F.3d 1154, cert.granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
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copyright infringement claims against these networks. Part II will discuss the
background of the contributory copyright infringement action, especially as
applied by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1984 Sony Corporalion ofAmerica v.
UniversalCy Studios, Inc. decision. Part III will examine the two divergent paths
that the Seventh and Ninth Circuit have followed in applying Sony to peer-to-peer
software providers. Part IV will argue that the Supreme Court should adopt the
Seventh Circuit's reading of Sony in the peer-to-peer context as it produces better
policy results, is more in line with the spirit and letter of the Sony decision, and
offers a more economically efficient litigation strategy for copyright holders to
pursue in protecting their rights.
I. INTRODUCTION TO PEER-TO-PEER SOFTWARE

Even by the standards of the rapidly evolving Internet, the widespread use of
peer-to-peer networks is a relatively new phenomenon.' Peer-to-peer networks
are a class apart from the usual client-server model of the World Wide Web,
where users seek information from a centrally located computer that is connected
to the Internet.' In a peer-to-peer network, users around the world can act as a
source of information for other users connected through the network at the same
time they take in information from these or other users who are similarly
connected. 9 With the popularity of peer-to-peer services for sharing both
copyrighted and uncopyrighted materials in recent years, it should come as no
surprise that many different methods for connecting interested computer users
have developed.' ° The different structures of these networks can have profound
effects on the various peer-to-peer providers' exposure to contributory copyright
infringement liability."
The architect basically has three broad design options in setting up a peer-topeer network. 2 This choice can have a dramatic effect on the scope of the
provider's exposure for contributory copyright infringement. 3 The first option

Peer-to-Peer-TheNext Computing Frontier,Bus. FINANCE, Sept. 2000, at 54.
Id.
Richard Waters, The Exchange of Music, Films and Pieces of InformationAmong Networks of Home
Computers is Confounding the Ambitions ofSoftware, Hardware and Telecoms Groups, FIN. TIMES, July 19,
2000, at 22.
10 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 719 (2003) (noting "four recognized
classes of application design").
" See, e.g., GroksterII, 380 F.3d 1154,72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (9th Cir. 2004); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster

nI.

12See Wu, supra note 10, at 719.
13See, e.g., GroksterII, 380 F.3d 1154; NapsterI, 239 F.3d 1004.
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in setting up a peer-to-peer network is to use a fully distributed indexing system.
In such a system, an index of all the files offered by each individual user is kept
on the individual user's computer. 14 A user's search request is then transmitted
between all of the networked individual computers until the resource is located
or the search expires.'" Such systems can be unwieldy because of the number of
users whose computers must be searched prior to returning a result from the
search) 6 The users are directly linked, though, and do not require a centralized
server in order to operate their system, making the system difficult to shut down
once the software that connects individual users has been widely distributed. 7
To make use of the open-source Gnutella network, an example of a fully
distributed model, an individual need only download one of the software clients
that connects to the network. 8 The Gnutella website currently lists seven
software clients for the Microsoft Windows operating system, five for the opensource Linux operating system, and two for the Macintosh operating system. 9
BearShare, Limewire, and Morpheus are the most prominent of these clients.20
A second and more centralized model is the FastTrack protocol used by the
Kazaa and Grokster clients.2' This network makes use of "supernodes," which
are high-speed users' computers that store index files containing information that
other users connected to the supernode are offering for download.22 Search
requests are then handled between supernodes, rather than broadcast to each
individual user's computer. 23 The function of these supernodes in collecting an

14Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

in the Age ofNapster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 866 (2004).

15 Andrew B. Katz, Post-NasterRuling: File-SharingSoftware Not Liablefor Copnght Infringement,
PA. L. WKLY., June 16, 2003, at S3.
16 Wu, supra note 10, at 722.

7 See id at 731-32 ("Gnutella developers compare the network they designed to a cocktail party
where users trade files with whomever happens to be nearby .... In other words, Gnutella's
designers created a filesharing network-GnutellaNet-that was unowned and uncontrolled and to
which various Gnutela programs could provide access.').
18 Feder, supra note 14, at 882.
19 GNUTELLA.COM, at http://www.gnuteUa.com/connect/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
20See, e.g., MORPHEUS.coM, FAQ, at http://www.morpheus.com/faq.html (last visited Oct. 1,

2004).

Wu, supra note 10, at 734.
GROKSTER.COM, FAQ-SUPERNODES, athttp://www.grokster.com/us/help/faq/supemodes.
html#FAQ-supemodes-l (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); KAZAA.COM, SUPERNODES, at http://www.
kazaa.com/us/help/faq/supernodes.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
23 S.Dave Wilby, File Sharing: Whether You're a Fan of Freel DistributedDigitalMusic or Paid-for
Services Managedby the Music Industy, It'Worth Knowing How Fi Sharing Works, INTERNET MAG., July
1, 2003, at 41 ("If you're a supernode, other KMD users near you will automatically provide your
machine with a list of the files they share. When people near you search for files, they'll send their
requests to you as the supemode."). In effect, the use of supernodes is meant to avoid the
21
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index of all the files available from the users connected to the supernode reduces
the overhead associated with a search. 24 FastTrack is also more centralized than
the Gnutella model because it incorporates a central server for connecting to the
protocol and maintaining user accounts.2 5
The third type of network is the most centralized and makes use of a single or
multiple central servers that maintain an index of the files of all of the users
connected to the network.2 ' This is accomplished by having the software that
connects to the network upload a list of the file names in each user's file library
when they first connect to the service.27 When another user searches for a
specific file, the search is sent to the central server which attempts to find the file
in the index it is maintaining and, if successful, connects the searching user to a
user that is sharing the file on the network.28 Such a system requires the least
amount of computing power, since only a small number of computers have to be
searched to locate resources available on the network. 29 Napster 30 operated such
a model and its legal problems are one of the primary 31reasons why later peer-topeer networks have avoided this type of architecture.
I1. THE BACKGROUND OF CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

The Supreme Court first recognized contributory copyright infringement in
1911.32 Despite this, Congress has never explicitly codified contributory copyright
infringement.33 Although the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act
indicates that Congress has considered the problem, Congress has left the task of
defining the scope of a contributory copyright infringement claim largely to the

inefficiencies of the Gnutella model by reducing the number of computers that must be searched
in order to locate resources matching the search terms. Id
24 Feder, supra note 14, at 865.
25 Wu, supra note 10, at 735.
26 Feder, supra note 14, at 865-66.
27 NapsterII,239 F.3d at 1011-12.
28 Id. at 1012; see also Katz, supra note 15, at S3.
29 Feder, supra note 14, at 866.
30 Napster has reemerged as a legal site, offering music downloads for a price. David F.
Gallagher, For Users,Napster of Old IsJust a Few Tweaks Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at C6. In
this discussion, Napster refers to the pre-2001 version that allowed users to download music files
from one another without any subscription or per-track download fee.
31 Wu, supra note 10, at 730-37.
32 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (holding that the defendant, who had made
an unauthorized film of General Lew Wallace's book Ben Hur, was liable for infringement despite
merely having sold the film to others who then arranged for the infringing commercial exploitation).
" See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 665, 675 (1984) ('The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another.").
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courts. 4 As a result, case law, rather than statutory law, controls any contributory
infringement claim.
A widely accepted definition of the term "contributory copyright infringer" is
"one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another."3 There are three elements to
a claim for contributory copyright infringement: First, an underlying direct
infringement by a third party, second, knowledge of the direct infringement by the
alleged contributory infringer, and third, a material contribution to the direct
infringer. 36 The knowledge
requirement is an objective standard: "knowledge, or
37
reason to know."
In the context of peer-to-peer contributory infringement litigation, the 1984
Sony decision has arisen as the most influential precedent because of its treatment
of a product that was capable of being put to both infringing and noninfringing
38
uses.

A. SONY CORP. OFAMERICA V. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC

In Sony, the Supreme Court was faced with litigation brought by holders of
copyrights on television programs and movies. 39 The copyright holders alleged
that the defendant, as the maker and marketer of the Betamax video tape
recorder, should be held liable for copyright infringements committed by the
Betamax consumers.' 4 The Central District of California had denied the plaintiffs'
claims primarily on the basis of fair use,41 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding

3 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) ("[T]he owner of copyright under this tide has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorizeany of the following." (emphasis added)); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976),
reprintedin1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5674 ("The exclusive rights accorded to acopyright owner under
section 106 are 'to do and to authorize' any of the activities specified in the five numbered clauses.
Use of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory
infringers.'.
3' Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,1162,170 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 182, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding contributory copyright liability for concert promoters
whose artists incorporated copyrighted material into their performances).
36 Id.; Napster I,239 F.3d 1004, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729, 1738-39 (9th Cir. 2001).
37 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902
F.2d 829, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (11th Cir. 1990).
38 Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-20.
39 Id.at 419.
4 Id.
41 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429,456,203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
656, 684 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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that the home recording was not a fair use and that the plaintiffs had established
the elements of contributory copyright infringement.42
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's holding that Sony was liable for contributory
infringement, the Supreme Court first noted that any finding of infringement
would be based on the fact that Sony had "sold equipment with constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. ' 43 Previous cases finding contributory liability for copyright infringement had involved relationships where the
contributory infringer "was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works
by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner": 44 an element not present in this case. While this was a novel theory in
copyright law, the Court found an analogy in patent law's staple article of
commerce doctrine. 4a The doctrine requires a careful balancing of the patent
holder's monopoly right and the public's interest in continued access to the
unpatented article. 46 This owes to the fact that a finding of contributory
infringement is the equivalent of extending the patent holder's monopoly right
because it allows the patent holder to control the public's access to the
unpatented article. 47 For this reason, the Court held that the sale of an article
the product was capable of
could not constitute contributory infringement if 48
being put to consumer use for legitimate purposes.
This decision creates a seemingly bright-line rule. If the product is capable of
being used for substantial legitimate purposes, the seller cannot be held liable for
contributory infringement on the basis of sales and distribution alone. A greater
degree of control over and knowledge of the actual infringer's activity would be
42 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 977, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

761, 775 (9th Cir. 1981).
13 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
44 Id. at 437.
45 Id. at 440; see also 35 U.S.C. 5 271(c) (2000). The statute states:

Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 441-42.
47 Id. ("The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright
holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory
monopoly, and the tights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.").
41 Id. at 442 ("Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.').
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required for liability to exist. The next paragraph in the opinion used different
language, however, that puts the exact standard into doubt; specifically,
"substantial noninfringing uses" becomes "commercially significant noninfringing
uses. ' 49 While the two terms can be reconciled and are perhaps synonymous, the
Court fails to further flesh out the "commercially significant noninfringing uses"
language because it concludes that the time-shifting function of the Betamax
alone is commercially significant."0
By failing to further explain of the importance of noninfringing uses and their
commercial viability the court has created quite a bit of uncertainty about what a
Sony defense entails, especially in the context of peer-to-peer software whose
commercial applications may still be developing and whose business models seem
to diverge significantly from past technologies."' The primary argument in a Sony
defense is that an alleged contributory infringer who can prove that its product
is capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses cannot be held liable for
contributory copyright infringement without a showing of something more than
constructive knowledge by the manufacturer that the product was being used to
infringe others' copyrights.5 2
Uncertainties arise when trying to determine what must be demonstrated to
establish a noninfringing use and what exact effect the presence of such a use has
on the disposition of the litigation. Lower courts have had significant trouble in
applying the Sony decision to peer-to-peer litigation, as will be explored more fully
in the section to follow.

49

Id.
o See id.The Court states:
In order to resolve that question, we need not explore allthe different potential
uses of the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute
infringement. Rather, we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts
as found by the district court a significant number of them would be noninfringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not give precise
content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one
potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard, however it is
understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so both
(A) because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from
authorizing it for their programs, and (B) because the District Court's factual
findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifring of respondents'
programs is legitimate fair use.
s, Ann Bartow, Investing Tecbnology:An Essay, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 99-102 (2001).
52 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE NINTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF SONY IN THE PEER-TO-PEER CONTEXT

The Sony decision's cryptic reference to the role of noninfringing uses and
commercial viability of these uses has led to a disagreement between the Ninth
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals about the proper role of such uses and
their commercial viability in peer-to-peer litigation.
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

1. Napster. The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to apply the
Sony decision in the context of peer-to-peer software in its A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. (NapsterII) ruling.53 The plaintiffs in Napster II were the copyright
holders of various sound recordings that the defendant peer-to-peer service had
allowed to be posted and shared through its MusicShare software and its servers.5 4
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the defendant to shut
down its service after finding a strong likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail
on the merits of its contributory copyright infringement and vicarious liability
claims.55 In some ways, the case was easy for the District Court, since the fact
that about eighty-seven percent of the material available on Napster was
percent
copyrighted and that the plaintiffs held the copyrights on about seventy
6
of this material clearly established the direct infringement prong.
The Napsterdefendants attempted to assert Sony's staple of commerce doctrine
as an affirmative defense.5 7 In considering whether the Napster service was
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses, the District Court
concentrated primarily on the noninfringing uses for which Napster alleged its
service was then being used, "including sampling, space-shifting, and the
authorized distribution of new artists' work. ' 18 The District Court rejected all of
these possible uses of Napster as commercially significant uses that would trigger
the Sony protection against contributory liability.5 9 The only commercially

s Napster 1, 239 F.3d 1004, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729 (9th Cir. 2001).
-'4

Id.at 1010-11.

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780,
1803-04 (N.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Napster 1].
239 F.3d at 1013.
' Id.at 911; Napster I1,
57 Napster1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
58 Id.at 913. "Sampling" is the practice of downloading music in order to make a decision as
to whether to purchase the recording that embodies the work. NapsterlI,239 F.3d at 1018. "Space5'

shifting" involves converting the songs in a recording into MP3 format and using a peer-to-peer
service to transfer the music to a new computer or location. NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
59Napsterl, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916-17. The court stated:

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/7
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significant use the court identified was that Napster software aided the infringing
activities of members.6" After noting the defendant's failure to demonstrate a
significant noninfringing use, the District Court refused to allow the Sony
defense.6' With the element of direct infringement by another party satisfied, the
court's holding that Napster's actual knowledge of this infringement and its ability
to shut down the service due to its centralized servers satisfied the material
contribution element.62 Thus, the District Court found that the plaintiffs were
infringement and
likely to succeed on their claim for contributory copyright
63
granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding on the contributory
copyright infringement claim but on different grounds.' First, the panel held that
"[c] ontributory liability requires that the secondary infringer 'know or have reason
to know' of direct infringement. '"65 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court that Napster had actual, not just constructive, knowledge of the direct
infringements66 and, as a result, Sony did not protect Napster from contributory
liability.

67

Sony was of only limited worth to Napster because of the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Sony holding and the District Court's analysis of Napster's
noninfringing uses. 68 The court treated Sony as an interpretation of the knowledge

Defendant fails to show that space-shifting constitutes a commercially significant

use of Napster. Indeed, the most credible explanation for the exponential
growth of traffic to the website is the vast array of free MP3 files offered by
other users-not the ability of each individual to space-shift music she already
owns. Thus, even if space-shifting is a fair use, it is not substantial enough to

preclude liability under the staple article of commerce doctrine.
Id. Further, the court rejected the distribution of new artists' work as a substantial use because it did
"not represent a substantial or commercially significant aspect of Napster"; it was "an afterthought,

not a major aspect of the Napster business plan." 1d at 917.
60 Id. at 912 ("The substantial or commercially significant use of the service was, and continues

to be, the unauthorized downloading and uploading of popular music, most of which is copyrighted.").
61 Id. at 912-17.
62 Id. at 927.
63 Id.

4 Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1022.
61 Id.at 1020 (citing Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
845-46, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1012 (11th Cir. 1990); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,1373-74,37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,1554-56 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)).
66 NapsterI, 239 F.3d at 1020 ("It is apparent from the record that Napster has knowledge, both
actual and constructive, of direct infringement.").
67 Id. ('We observe that Napster's actual, specific knowledge of direct infringement renders
Sonys holding of limited assistance to Napster.').
68 See id
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element of a contributory copyright infringement claim. 69 As a result, a defendant
whose product was capable of substantial noninfringing uses to be contributorily
liable would have to possess actual knowledge of the direct infringements by the
third party.70
The Napster II holding requires a trial court to examine a product's uses in
order to determine if substantial noninfringing uses are present; here, the court
looked briefly at the proper standard for determining when a product was capable
of substantial noninfringing uses."1 The Ninth Circuit placed great weight on the
Sony Court's "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses"7 2 language,
holding that "[t]he district court improperly confined the use analysis to current
uses, ignoring the system's capabilities." 3 The court stopped there, however, and
did not attempt to examine potential and actual uses of Napster in order to
determine if a substantial noninfringing use existed because it issued its opinion
at an early point in the litigation and 7the
record supported a finding of actual
4
knowledge of the direct infringements
2. Grokster. The Grokster litigation was the next Ninth Circuit case to
address the issue of contributory copyright infringement in the context of peerto-peer software, and the first to follow the Sony doctrine as interpreted by the

69 Id.('The Sony Court declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants

made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and 'substantial noninfringing uses.' ") (quoting
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 678
(1984)).
70 Id. at 1021.

The court stated:

We agree that if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the
operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement. Conversely, absent
any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. To
enjoin simply because a computer network allows for infringing use would, in
our opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity unrelated to infringing
use.
Id. (citations omitted).
71 Id.

72 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
73 id.

14 Id. ("Regardless of the number of Napster's infringing versus noninfringing uses, the
evidentiary record here supported the district court's finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in
establishing that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infringement of plaintiffs'
copyrights.').

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/7

10

Myrick: Peer-to-Peer and Substantial Noninfringing Use: Giving the Term "

2005]

PEER-TO-PEER,SUBSTANTIAL NONINFRINGING USE

549

Napster litigation.75 The Grokster II court construed the contributory copyright
infringement rule from NapsterII as follows:
In NapsterII, we construed Sony-Betamax to apply to the knowledge
element of contributory copyright infringement. NapsterfI held that
if a defendant could show that its product was capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then constructive knowledge of the infringement could not be imputed. Rather,
if substantial non-infringing use was shown, the copyright owner
would be required to show that the defendant had reasonable
knowledge of specific infringing files.76
The Ninth Circuit determined, as a threshold matter, that it was necessary to
ascertain whether the Grokster defendants' services were capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.77 Based on this finding, the court would be able to determine
the requisite level of knowledge about potential infringing uses."' The District
Court found it "undisputed that there are substantial noninfringing uses for
Defendants' software"79 and the Ninth Circuit agreed "that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to noninfringing use."' Relying on the Sony Court's
"capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses"8 1 language, the district
court stressed that "the existence of substantial noninfringing uses turns not only
on a product's current uses, but also on potential future noninfringing uses. ' '82
The Ninth Circuit opinion makes this capability-based approach to determining
substantial noninfringing use even more explicit.8 3 In response to the copyright

7sSee GroksterII, 380 F.3d 1154, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (9th Cir. 2004); Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1579 (C.D. Cal.
2003) [hereinafter Grokster 1].
76 GroksterII, 380 F.3d at 1160-61.
77

Id. at 1161.

78 id.
79 Grokster I,

259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. The district court went on to simply list some
noninfringing uses for which the defendants' software had purportedly been used: "to facilitate and
search for public domain materials, government documents, media content for which distribution
is authorized, media content as to which the rights owners do not object to distribution, and
computer software for which distribution is permitted."
go GroikterII, 380 F.3d at 1161.
s Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
82 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. The district court apparently did not deem it necessary
to explore potential noninfringing uses of the defendants' software, probably because the court had
already determined that the current uses were "substantial noninfringing uses." Id.at 1035. For
good measure, however, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs did not dispute that there were
potential substantial noninfringing use of the defendants' software. Id. at 1036.
83 GroksterI1,380 F.3d at 1162.
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holders' argument that the primary use of the defendants' software was to infringe
copyright, the court stated that "[t]his argument misapprehends the Sony standard
as construed in NapsterL ' 4 Instead, the court stressed that after Napster II, "in
order for limitations imposed by Sony to apply, a product need only be capable of
'
substantial noninfringing uses." 85
With the capacity for "substantial noninfringing uses" established, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the District Court that the defendants "could not be held
liable for constructive knowledge of infringement, and the Copyright Owners
were required to show that the Software Distributors had reasonable knowledge
of specific infringement to satisfy the threshold knowledge requirement. '86 This
construction of Sony, which led to liability for the defendant in the Napster II
litigation,8" dictated a different result in Grokster11.8" The Grokster defendants'
89
software differs fundamentally from the Napsterdefendant's.
The decentralized
nature of the indexing function and the lack of a centralized server in the
Grokster system resulted in a timing issue that was not present in the Napster II
litigation. Courts must look to whether there was actual knowledge of the
infringing activity at a point where the defendants could contribute to or stop the
activity.90 The structure of the defendants' software did not allow them to exert
any control over the direct infringer's behavior at the time of the infringing
84 See id.

Perhaps concerned about the Sony decision's use of the term "commercially

significant," which the Supreme Court used seemingly interchangeably with "substantial," the Ninth
Circuit further saw fit to find that "the Software Distributors have not only shown that their
products are capable of substantial noninfringing uses, but that the uses have commercial viability."
Id.; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 ('The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses.').
85 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162.
Id.; Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 ("[C]ontributory infringement accrues where a
defendant has actual-not merely constructive-knowledge of the infringement at a time during
which the defendant materially contributes to that infringement.").
8' Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021-22.
88 GroksterII, 380 F.3d at 1163; Grokster1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
89 See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (noting "a seminal distinction between
Grokster/StreamCast and Napster").
90 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 ("[T]he time at which such knowledge is obtained is
significant ....
[T]he Copyright Owners were required to establish that the Software Distributors
had 'specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contribute[d] to the infringement,
and fal[ed] to act upon that information.' ') (quoting Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036). The
district court presented the issue as follows:
Here, it is undisputed that Defendants are generally aware that many of their
users employ Defendants' software to infringe copyrighted works. The question,
however, is whether actual knowledge of specific infringement accrues at a time
when either Defendant materially contributes to the alleged infringement, and
can therefore do something about it.
GroksterI,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
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activity.91 The District Court had noted that even "[i]f either Defendant closed
their doors and deactivated all computers within their control, users of their
products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption. ' '92 The Ninth
Circuit noted this fact in affirming the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendants on the contributory infringement claim.93 . The
District Court had concluded that the defendants in this case were similar to Sony
and Xerox, who manufacture products that may be used for infringing and
noninfringing purposes but, because of the relationship between the manufacturer
and the user, are unaware of infringing activity at the time that it occurs.94 This
is unlike the situation of the defendant in Napster,who distributed software that
could be used for infringing and noninfringing purposes, but, because of the
centralized architecture of the system, had knowledge of the infringing activity at
the time it was taking place and was in a position to stop the behavior.95 With
constructive knowledge of direct infringement inadequate to satisfy the
knowledge element under Napster I's reading of Sony, and with the Napster II
court's requirement that actual knowledge arise at a time when the defendant is
in a position to prevent the infringement, the plaintiffs in GroksterII were unable
to satisfy the knowledge element of a contributory copyright infringement
96
action.
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

In In re Aimster CopyrightLifigation the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took
a different approach from the Ninth Circuit in applying the Sony doctrine in the
peer-to-peer context. 97 Aimster was a peer-to-peer program that "piggyback[ed]
on" the America Online instant messaging system and allowed users connected
to the service to designate files on the users' computers that they wished to share
with others.9" When a search request came in to the Aimster server, the server
would attempt to match the user searching for the file with a user who had
91 GroksterI, 380 F.3d at 1163; GroksterI, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-43.
92

Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.

91GroksterI, 380 F.3d at 1163.
94 GroksterI,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
95 Id.
96 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163; see also
Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-43 (concluding that
the material contribution element of contributory copyright infringement could not be satisfied
because the defendants did not have knowledge of specific infringement at a time when they could
prevent such infringement).
97 Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (7th Cir. 2003).
" Id. at 646-47; see also Recording Industry Association of America, Frequently Asked
PQueslions-LawsuitAgainst Aimster, at http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/aimsterjfaq.asp#work
(providing a somewhat less objective description of the Aimster service).
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marked that file for sharing on his hard drive and then command the host
computer to transfer the file directly to the requesting computer.99 The infringing
material never passed through Aimster's servers, making an action for direct
°
infringement unavailable, as in the NapsterIIcase.'0
Neither the district court nor
Seventh Circuit opinion make entirely clear whether a centralized index was
maintained, but for purposes of comparison, Aimster functioned much more like
the centralized Napster system than the decentralized model of Grokster.
1. Aimster I-The District Court. After establishing direct copyright
infringement by Aimster users,"' the District Court examined whether the
defendant had the requisite knowledge for the plaintiff to establish a successful
contributory infringement claim) 2 The District Court concluded that Aimster
had actual knowledge of the direct infringement by its users for four reasons:
First, the RIAA sent letters to Aimster, detailing the infringing activity taking
place on its system; Second, the tutorial explaining how to use the Aimster service
specifically used transferring copyrighted works as an example of the use of the
system; Third, Aimster's bulletin boards and chat rooms were full of examples of
users discussing the transfer of copyrighted works on Aimster; and Fourth,
Aimster included a service known as "Club Aimster," where the "[diefendants
actually comment[ed] upon and track[ed] the top copyrighted sound recordings
available on Aimster."' 13 The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the
encrypted nature of the messages between individual users that prevented Aimster
from having knowledge of actual file transfers similarly prevented them from
having actual knowledge of infringing activity. 1°4 Specifically, the court stated that
"there is absolutely no indication in the precedential authority that such spedfidcy
of knowledge is required in the contributory infringement context."10 5 These

99AimsterII, 334 F.3d at 646.
1o Id.at 646-47. Judge Posner compares and contrasts the service's function to a stock exchange:
[Blecause copies of the songs reside on the computers of the users and not on
Aimster's own server, Aimster is not a direct infringer of the copyrights on those
songs. Its function is similar to that of a stock exchange, which is a facility for
matching offers rather than a repository of the things being exchanged (shares
of stock). But unlike transactions on a stock exchange, the consummated
"transaction" in music files does not take place in the facility, that is, in Aimster's
server.
101In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. I11. 2002) [hereinafter
Aimster 1.
102

Id. at 650.

103

Id.

104 Id at 651.
05

Id. The court also indicates that setting up a system whereby the peer-to-peer provider was

willfully blind to the infringing activity should not prevent a finding of actual knowledge of the direct
infringements, stating that "[ilt is also disingenuous of Defendants to suggest that they lack the
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facts led the court to conclude that the defendants had actual knowledge of users'
infringing activity on the Aimster service." 6
In an attempt to avail itself to Sony, the defendant in Aimster claimed that the
°7
service was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. O
Unlike the Ninth Circuit,
the District Court here did not examine the applicability of Sony under the
knowledge element of contributory copyright infringement; instead, the court
examined Sony's applicability as a separate defense after concluding that the
defendant had actual and constructive knowledge of the directly infringing activity
of its users.'
The defendant specifically identified three noninfringing uses of
Aimster: First, the ability to share noncopyrighted works with other users,
second, "the ability . . . to identify other users with similar interests, share
information, and develop clubs," and third, the ability to transfer business records
between users. 9 Despite these possible noninfringing uses, the district court
refused to apply the principles of Sony to the Aimster service, distinguishing the
two in several ways." 0 The District Court read Sony as applying only to products
that had a principal noninfringing use, were sold to consumers who decided how
to use the product later in the absence of an ongoing relationship between the
seller and the consumer, involved primarily private use and not distribution of
infringing works, were not "specifically manufactured" for infringing use, and
were distributed by a seller who did not encourage the infringing activity."'
In the District Court's eyes, Aimster failed to meet any of these criteria to
establish a Sony defense." 2 Far from establishing that the principal use of Aimster
was for noninfringing purposes, the court found no evidence that any users
actually engaged in noninfringing uses."' Aimster could not meet the court's
second requirement because, as a service, the users enjoyed an ongoing
relationship with the distributor, in contrast to the seller-consumer model in
Sony." 4 As a third point of distinction, the District Court stated that Sony could

requisite level of knowledge when their putative ignorance is due entirely to an encryption scheme
that they themselves put in place."
""' Id. at 650.
107 Id. at 652-53.

'0' Id. at 650-54.
'09 Id. at 653.
110 Id. at 653-54.
1"1 Id.
112

Id. at 653.

113 Id. ("Defendants here have provided no evidence whatsoever.., that Aimster is actually used

for any of the stated non-infringing purposes... the evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the primay use of Aimster is the transfer of copyrighted material among its users.").
114 Id (likening this relationship to the swap meet organizers in Fonovisa, Inc. v. CheryAuction, Inc.,
76 F.3d 259, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590 (9th Cit. 1996) whom the Ninth Circuit held contributorily
liable for the sale of copyrighted works sold and marketed by independent retailers).
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not apply to a situation involving distribution of infringing works since, in Sony,
there was " '[n]o issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other persons.' -115
Since Aimster made its users distributors, as well as infringers, of copyrighted
material, the court reasoned that Sony did not apply." 6 As its fourth and fifth
reasons for not allowing a Sony defense, the District Court found that Aimster was
"a service specifically designed to aid the infringing activities of its users" and that
Aimster "actually goes to great lengths to both influence and encourage the direct
infringement among its users.""1 7 Perhaps the most important reason for denying
Aimster's Sony defense was the court's distinction between the manufacturer of
the Betamax recorder in Sony as an "innocent enabler" and the court's finding that
Aimster actively encouraged the use of its system for infringing purposes." 8 In
light of the evidence of direct infringement, Aimster's contribution to that
infringement, and the absence of Sony protections, the District Court found that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their contributory infringement claim and
granted a preliminary injunction against Aimster. 19
2. Aimster II-The Seventh Circuit. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed
with the District Court that Sony did not control in this case. 2 ° The court first
addressed the industry's argument that Sony was inapplicable to services.' 2' The
recording industry pointed out that a peer-to-peer service, unlike the manufacturer of the Betamax, "has a continuing relation with its customers and therefore
should be able to prevent, or at least limit, [the customers] infringing copyright
by monitoring [the customersi use of the service and terminating them when it
is discovered that they are infringing.' ' 22 The industry argued that because of this
ongoing relationship, "the test [for knowledge of contributory infringement] is
merely whether the provider knows it's being used to infringe copyright. 123 The
Seventh Circuit maintained that the existence of an ongoing relationship should
be a factor, though not a controlling one, in deciding whether a service provider
is a contributory infringer. 24 Circumstances still might exist where the costs of
preventing infringement would be so great that Sony's rationale of finding no

116

Aimster1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 425).
Id.

117

id

11

118 Id.

19 Id. at 665-66.
120 AimsterI,

334 F.3d at 647.

Id at 648.
122 Id.
121

123

Id.

124

Id.
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in the presence of both infringing and noninfringing
contributory infringement
25
uses might still hold up.
The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the recording industry's argument that
Sony is not applicable when there is a showing of a higher level of knowledge of
infringement than the mere existence of infringing uses.' 2 6 The Seventh Circuit
found support for this decision in the Sony Court's acknowledgment that about
twenty-five percent of Betamax users were using the system for an infringing
purpose and the manufacturer still avoided contributory liability.' 27 Furthermore,
128
the court specifically rejected the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Napster I,
which held that actual knowledge of infringement would be enough to satisfy the
knowledge element of a contributory infringement claim. 129 Despite the recording
industry's strong arguments, the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to find that Sony
did not apply to services 30when infringing and noninfringing uses of the service
could be demonstrated.1
The Aimster II court's ruling on the applicability of Sony was not completely
adverse to the recording industry. The court was not willing to accept the
defendants' argument that the plaintiffs had to demonstrate an actual financial
loss in order to prevail on a contributory infringement claim, reasoning that the
loss in the context of fair use rather than
Sony Court had examined financial
3
contributory infringement.1 1

125 Id. at 648-49. The court stated:

If a service facilitates both infringing and noninfringing uses, as in the case of
AOL's instant-messaging service, and the detection and prevention of the
infringing uses would be highly burdensome, the rule for which the recording
industry is contending could result in the shutting down of the service or its
annexation by the copyright owners (contrary to the clear import of the Sony
decision), because the provider might find it impossible to estimate its potential
damages liability to the copyright holders and would anyway face the risk of
being enjoined.
126 Id. at 649.
127 Id.; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 452 n.36.
128 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 649.
129 NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1020.
130Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 649. The Seventh Circuit seems to imply that the solution for the
recording industry in this case might lie in the legislative, rather than the judicial process, stating that
"[t]he recording industry's hostility to the Sony decision is both understandable, given the amount
of Internet-enabled infringement of music copyrights, and manifest-the industry in its brief offers
five reasons for confining its holding to its specific facts ... it is being articulated in the wrong
forum." Id.
131 Id.; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-56. The Aimster I court stated:
[A] copyright owner who can prove infringement need not show that the
infringement caused him a financial loss. Granted, without such a showing he
cannot obtain compensatory damages; but he can obtain statutory damages, or
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The Seventh Circuit then laid out its interpretation of the Sony decision in the
context of peer-to-peer technology:
[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has
noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the
respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of
contributory infringement .... But, the balancing of costs and
benefits is necessary only in a case in which substantial
32
noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated.
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the standard for establishing current or
future substantial noninfringing uses and the result of such a showing proved
crucial in determining whether Aimster could be held liable as a contributory
133
infringer.
The Seventh Circuit first rejected the argument that the Sony Court's
discussion of potential and current noninfringing uses dictates that "all Aimster
has to show in order to escape liability for contributory infringement is that its file
sharing system could be used in noninfringing ways, which obviously it could
be.' ' 134 The court based its holding primarily on its concern that such a policy
would allow a service that was used solely for infringing activity to escape liability
if it could be shown that it was potentially able to be used in a noninfringing
manner.'35 In addressing this concern, the court likened contributory copyright

an injunction, just as the owner of physical property can obtain an injunction
against a trespasser without proving that the trespass has caused him a financial
loss.
AimsterII, 334 F.3d at 649.
132 Aim terII, 334 F.3d at 649-50.
133See id.
134Id. at 651.
135Id. The court supported itself with several different facts from the Sony decision. In

regards
to the argument that a single potential noninfringing use removes a service from contributory
liability, the court states:
Were that the law, the seller of a product or service used solely to facilitate
copyright infringement, though it was capable inprinciple of noninfringing uses,
would be immune from liability for contributory infringement. That would be
an extreme result, and one not envisaged by the Sony majority. Otherwise its
that Sony had not
opinion would have had no occasion to emphasize the fact ...
in its advertising encouraged the use of the Betamax to infringe copyright. Nor
would the Court have thought it important to say that the Betamax was used
"principally" for time shifting, . ..a fair use, or to remark that the plaintiffs
owned only a small percentage of the total amount of copyrighted television
programming and it was unclear how many of the other owners objected to
home taping.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/7

18

Myrick: Peer-to-Peer and Substantial Noninfringing Use: Giving the Term "

PEER-TO-PEER, SUBSTANTAL NONINFRINGING USE

2005]

557

infringement to the criminal doctrine of aiding and abetting: the stronger the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the underlying crime, the more
appropriate it is to apply civil or criminal liability.'36 Instead, the court indicated
that some balance must be found between protecting legitimate services that allow
for both infringing and noninfringing uses and providing adequate protection for
'
copyright holders. 37
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Aimster's attempt to invoke the Sony Court's
admonishment that a contributory infringement claim cannot rest upon
constructive knowledge of the infringing uses. 118 Aimster encrypted the messages
and file transfers between its users so that the defendants were unaware of its
users' specific copyright infringing activities.' 39 Aimster reasoned that in the
absence of specific knowledge of the infringing acts, it was inappropriate to hold
them liable for contributory infringement because to do so would be to hold them
liable on the basis of constructive knowledge."4 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
finding that Aimster's use of encryption technologies was the equivalent of
willfully blinding itself to direct infringement and that the defendant could not
escape liability "by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning
what surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service-maybe allthe users of his service-are copyright infringers.''. At the same
time, the court felt it necessary to point out that not all instant messaging or file
sharing systems would be liable for contributory copyright infringement if their

(citations omitted).
Id.
136Id. The court specifically analogized contributory infringement to aiding and abetting
prostitution:
A retailer of slinky dresses is not guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even
if he knows that some of his customers are prostitutes-he may even know
which ones are. The extent to which his activities and those of similar sellers
actually promote prostitution is likely to be slight relative to the social costs of
imposing a risk of prosecution on him. But the owner of a massage parlor who
employs women who are capable of giving massages, but in fact as he knows sell
only sex and never massages to their customers, is an aider and abettor of
The slinky-dress case corresponds to Sony, and, like Sony, is not
prostitution ....
inconsistent with imposing liability on the seller of a product or service that, as
in the massage-parlor case, is capable of noninfringing uses but in fact is used
only to infringe.
Id. (citations omitted).
137Id. ("To the recording industry, a single known infringing use brands the facilitator as a
contributory infringer. To the Aimsters of this world, a single noninfringing use provides complete
immunity from liability. Neither is correct.").
138Id. at 650; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
139 AimsterI, 334 F.3d at 650.
140 Id.
141

id.
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systems were used to infringe, stating, "[o]ur point is only that a service provider
that would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by
using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes
for which the service is being used."' '
The court then applied its reading of the Sony doctrine to the Aimster service.
After noting the service tutorial's exclusive use of examples of downloading
copyrighted works as a use of the service and the ease with which members could
download the plaintiffs copyrighted works through the provision of the Club
Aimster service, the court shifted the burden of proving substantial noninfringing
use to the defendant.1 4 3 The court noted five possible noninfringing uses of the
Aimster service'" but reiterated that it is not the existence of these noninfringing
uses that should be the primary focus of a contributory infringement inquiry;
rather, "the question is how probable [the noninfringing uses] are."' 45
Applying this "probability of noninfringing use" standard to the Aimster
service, the Seventh Circuit decided that Sony would not protect Aimster from
contributory liability."4 Quoting the District Court's finding of a complete
absence of evidence of use of Aimster for noninfringing purposes, 14 the Seventh
Circuit concluded that granting the preliminary injunction was appropriate,

142

Id. at 650-51. Such reasoning seems to completely contradict the district court's reasoning in

GroksterI, where the defendant's lack of specific knowledge of the actual direct infringements was
enough to defeat contributory liability despite the possibility that they had set up their system in this
way in order to avoid the fate of Napster. See GroksterI,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-46 ("The Court
is not blind to the possibility that Defendants may have intentionally structured their businesses to
avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefitting financially from the illicit draw
of their wares.").
14' AimsterII, 334 F.3d at 651-52.
144 Id.at 652-53. The five listed uses are transferring noncopyrighted works, increasing the value
of recordings by allowing them to be used as a form of currency in the on-line world,
noncopyrighted discussion of copyrighted music between members, discussion and exchange of
topics not related to copyrighted material, and space-shifting, which the Seventh Circuit felt was
arguably a fair use of copyrighted music. Id.
14 Id. at 653.
146
147

Id. at 653-54.
Id. The court states:

[Diefendants here have provided no evidence whatsoever.., that Aimster is
actually used for any of the stated non-infringing purposes. Absent is any
indication from real-life Aimster users that their primary use of the system is to
transfer non-copyrighted files to their friends or identify users of similar interests
and share information. Absent is any indication that even a single business
without a network administrator uses Aimster to exchange business records ....
Id. (quotingAimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 653).
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despite the lack of evidence on the costs that the Aimster service had imposed on
the plaintiffs.'48
The Seventh Circuit's reading of Sony requires a determination of the
probability that the service is actually being used for a noninfringing purpose.'4 9
The court's analysis seems to indicate that a properly established substantial
noninfringing use would be a complete bar to contributory copyright infringement, at least if the costs of abating the infringing uses were substantial.'
IV. PROPER APPLICATION OF SOINYIN THE PEER-TO-PEER
CONTEXT: THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO NONINFRINGING USE

At least two United States Circuit Courts have now considered the application
of Sony to peer-to-peer file sharing software.'' As explored above, the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits have reached very different conclusions about the role that
noninfringing uses of peer-to-peer software should be given in deciding the issue
of contributory copyright infringement. For the reasons set forth below, the
Seventh Circuit's application of Sony to peer-to-peer services is preferable to that
of the Ninth Circuit and should be adopted by the Supreme Court when it decides
the GroksterII appeal.
A. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S READING OF SONY PROVIDES MORE PROTECTION

FOR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS

If one starts with the proposition that sound copyright law should protect the
exclusive rights of copyright holders it purports to grant, it quickly becomes
evident that the Seventh Circuit has been much more successful than the Ninth
Circuit in crafting sound copyright law. The Ninth Circuit's NapsterIIand recent
Grokster II decisions provide a blueprint for how to set up a service that cannot
be held liable for contributory copyright infringement, despite massive amounts
of direct infringement. The provider need only create a service that allows some

14' Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 653 ("If the on# effect of a service challenged as contributory
infringement is to enable copyrights to be infringed, the magnitude of the resulting loss, even
whether there is a net loss, becomes irrelevant to liability.").
149See id
"0 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9 ("Implicit in the Aimster analysis is that a finding of

substantial noninfringing use, including potential use, would be fatal to a contributory infringement
claim, regardless of the level of knowledge possessed by the defendant. InAimster, no evidence was
tendered of any noninfringing product use.').
151 See Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1160-64, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244, 1247-50 (9th Cir. 2004);
Aimsterl, 334 F.3d 643, 647-53, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233, 1236-41 (7th Cir. 2003).
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noninfringing use, however trivial. The existence of a noninfringing use means
that constructive knowledge of direct infringement will not be implied to the
service provider and that specific knowledge of the infringement will be necessary
to satisfy the knowledge element of contributory infringement. The provider
need only spread out its indexing system to such a local level that it cannot
prevent individual acts of copyright infringement. If the software provider
succeeds, specific knowledge of the underlying infringements cannot satisfy the
knowledge element of a contributory copyright infringement claim because the
provider's knowledge would arise too late in the process to take any preventative
action.
The Seventh Circuit provides a better reasoned approach. In assessing
whether a product or service should receive Sony protection, the Seventh Circuit
requires an examination of the probability of both the infringing and
noninfringing uses."' Presumably, if a product is being used primarily for
noninfringing purposes, it will fall under Sony's protections. On the other hand,
if the system has largely been designed to allow users to infringe copyright, it will
expose the provider to liability for contributory copyright infringement. The
Seventh Circuit approach therefore preserves the viability of contributory
copyright infringement claims in the context of peer-to-peer software: a result
that the Ninth Circuit decisions have failed to reach.
B. THE

SEVENTH

CIRCUIT'S

APPROACH

TO

CONTRIBUTORY

COPYRIGHT

INFRINGEMENT IS MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SONY HOLDING

1. The Ninth Circuit's Capability-BasedApproach-Reading the Term "Substantial"
Out of "SubstantialNoninnging Use." In NapsterII, the Ninth Circuit was able to
assume that substantial noninfringing uses were present without attempting to
flesh out the term "substantial" because of its holding that the actual knowledge
standard was satisfied." 3 In GroksterII,the Ninth Circuit had to determine if the
substantial noninfringing use test had been satisfied, as the plaintiffs could not
satisfy the more rigid standard of actual knowledge of the directly infringing
activity, and liability would attach only if constructive knowledge of the services
users' infringement was sufficient.154
Unfortunately, the analyses of both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit
in this regard consist largely of statements that the substantiality requirement has

152AimsterII,

334 F.3d at 653.

153 NapsterI, 239 F.3d 1004,1022,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729, 1740 (9th Cit. 2001) ("The record

supports the district court's finding that Napster has actualknowledge that pedfic infringing material
is available using its system.'.
154 Grokster1, 380 F.3d at 1162.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/7

22

Myrick: Peer-to-Peer and Substantial Noninfringing Use: Giving the Term "
2005]

PEER-TO-PEEP,SUBSTANTIAL NONINFRINGING USE

561

been met5'5 and fail to give any guidance as to when a noninfringing use of a
service becomes a substantial noninfringing use. Instead, both the District Court
and the Ninth Circuit merely list a number of current and potential noninfringing
uses of the peer-to-peer services and conclude that the standard has been met." 6
Such an analysis basically guts Sony's "capable of substantial noninfringing use"
language by allowing federal courts in the Ninth Circuit to find that a substantial
noninfringing use exists as long as the defendant can offer up some current or
potential noninfringing use without court examination of the magnitude of the
use.
Such a test does not comport with the Supreme Court's framing of the issue
inSony, which stated that "[t]he question is thus whether the Betamax is capable
of commercially significant noninfringing uses."' 57 Throughout the Sony opinion,
the phrase "substantial noninfringing uses" is used interchangeably with
"commercially significant noninfringing uses."'58 The NapsterIdecisioncorrectly
identified this as the controlling test for establishing noninfringing uses in the
context of contributory infringement context,5 9 but the District Court in Grokster
I does not use the term "commercially significant" even once in its opinion. 16
The Grokster II opinion does pay lip service to the "commercially significant"
language but then simply concludes that some of the current noninfringing uses
are "commercially viable" without explaining why.'6 ' Without any exploration of
whether the Grokster service would exist in the absence of the infringing uses,
this conclusion seems weak, especially after the District Court had found, in the
vicarious infringement portion of its opinion, that the infringing uses of the
product were responsible for a substantial portion of the service's membership
and that this increased membership had allowed them to reap greater advertising
62
revenue.1

1..

Id. at 1161 ("[here is no genuine issue of material fact as to noninfringing use."); Grokster

I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 ("Here, it is undisputed that there are substantial noninfringing uses for
Defendants' software-e.g., distributing movie trailers, free songs or other non-copyrighted works;
using the software in countries where it is legal; or sharing the works of Shakespeare.').
156 GroksterII, 380 F.3d at 1161; GroksterI,259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,1035-36,66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1579, 1584 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
17 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 486 U.S. 417, 442, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
665, 678 (1984).
158 See, e.g., id.
159 NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1021 ("We depart from the reasoning of the district court that Napster
failed to demonstrate that its system is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.").
16oGrokster1,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
161 GroksterII, 380 F.3d at 1162 ("In this case, the Software Distributors have not only shown
that their products are capable of substantial noninfringing uses, but that the uses have commercial
viability.').
162 GroksterI,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 ("The more individuals who download the software, the
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The Ninth Circuit's construction of Sony in Napster II and its application in
GroksterIleffectively erase the requirement of Sony that the noninfringing uses be
substantial or commercially significant by focusing almost1 63
entirely on whether the
peer-to-peer service is capable of any noninfringing use.
2. The Seventh Circuit'sProbabilityBasedApproach---PutingSubstantialiyBack Into
SubstantialNoninfringing Use. In comparison to the Ninth Circuit the Seventh
Circuit has placed more emphasis on establishing the "commercially significant"
or "substantial" nature of a noninfringing use rather than the service's capability
to provide such a use.164 In deciding if a peer-to-peer service should be liable for
contributory infringement when it is capable of being put to infringing and
noninfringing uses, "some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these uses is
necessary.' 16 It would not be enough to escape contributory infringement for
Aimster to simply demonstrate that it was capable of substantial noninfringing
uses; it would have to demonstrate that the service was actually being put to these
noninfringing uses."'
The requirement of showing the probability or magnitude of the noninfringing
use is the Seventh Circuit's method for determining the commercial significance
of the noninfringing use. In the absence of evidence as to the magnitude of the
use, the use cannot be established as substantial, much less commercially
significant. Putting the burden on the defendant to prove that the service's
noninfringing use is commercially significant seems a fair trade-off for allowing
the defendant to escape contributory infringement. This also seems to comport
with the Sony decision where the defendant presented extensive evidence that the
primary use of the Betamax recorder by its consumers was time-shifting, a
practice that the Supreme Court deemed to be noninfringing 67
The court is careful to note that prospective noninfringing uses can qualify to
remove a defendant from contributory infringement.16 Such a showing seems
almost impossible in the Internet context, though, since a showing of the

more advertising revenue Defendants collect. And because a substantial number of users download
the software to acquire copyrighted material, a significant proportion of Defendants' advertising
revenue depends upon the infringement.").
163 See, e.g., Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 (referring to the plaintiffs' argument that the evidence
established that the vast majority of uses of the defendants' service were infringing, and stating that
"[t]his argument misapprehends the Sony standard as construed in Napsterl,which emphasized that
in order for limitations imposed by Sony to apply, a product need only be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses').
164AimsterlI, 334 F.3d at 649.
165 Id.

166 Id. at 651.
167
168

Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650 ("[Tihe balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case

in which substantial noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated.').
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magnitude and probability of a potential noninfringing use of current technology
would be dependent on the continuing viability of that technology and today's
1 69
Internet technology is often obsolete within a matter of years or months.
3. The Ninth Circuit Disinction Between Constructive and Actual Knowledge of the
Underlying Infringements Lacks a FirmBasis in Sony. Based on its reading of the Sony
decision, 7° the Ninth Circuit in Napster II held that the presence or absence of
substantial noninfringing uses of a service would determine the level of
knowledge of direct infringement that a peer-to-peer service provider would have
to possess in order to be held liable for contributory copyright infringement.'
In the absence of substantial noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge of the
directly infringing activity would be enough to satisfy the knowledge element of
a contributory copyright infringement claim. At the same time, the existence of
substantial noninfringing uses-whether current or future-requires a plaintiff
to show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the specific infringing
72

activities.'

Such a reading does not seem to comport with the Sony opinion which flatly
states that "the sale of copying equipment.. . does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes.' ' 173 Rather than imputing a heightened level of knowledge, as the Ninth
Circuit has done, the Sony opinion seems to completely remove the distribution
of products that are capable of substantial noninfringing uses from the types of
activity that can trigger contributory copyright liability.
While the Seventh Circuit did not have to come to a decision on whether there
were substantial noninfringing uses in Aimster II, the opinion seems to hint that
the existence of a substantial noninfringing use will be fatal to a contributory
infringement claim. 174 Such a reading seems to comport more easily with the text
and result of the Sony decision.

169 This fact is underscored by the Aimster 1I court's own recognition that the principal use of

technologies similar to the Betamax was the home-viewing of commercial films, rather than the
taping of television broadcasts. Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 649-50.
170 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020 ("The Sony Court declined to impute the requisite level of
knowledge where the defendants made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and
'substantial noninfringing uses.' " (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442)).
171 Id at
172

1021.

Id. ("[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system

operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.").
173 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
174 See Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9 ("Implicit in the Aimster analysis is that a finding of
substantial noninfringing use, including potential use, would be fatal to a contributory infringement
claim, regardless of the level of knowledge possessed by the defendant. InAimster, no evidence was
tendered of any noninfringing product use.').
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C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S AJMSTER HOLDING ALLOWS COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
TO ENGAGE IN A MORE ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT LITIGATION STRATEGY

The Ninth Circuit approach to determining noninfringing use forces copyright
owners to pursue the individual direct infringers rather than the service providers
who enable infringement. This greatly increases the costs of litigation by
multiplying the number of suits involved and the search costs necessary for
locating these infringers.' 75 It also creates forum problems, since many of the
direct infringers are not subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts.",
By preserving the viability of the contributory copyright claim, the Seventh
Circuit approach would allow copyright holders to engage in a more economically
efficient litigation strategy. This approach denies the Sony defense to peer-to-peer
networks that are being used primarily or solely to engage in copyright infringement, exposing such networks to contributory liability. This reduces overall costs
by allowing copyright holders to pursue the source of copyright infringement in
a small number of suits, rather than the individual infringers in a multitude of
lawsuits. Copyright holders should have an effective and efficient tool against
those profiting from copyright infringement, and the Seventh Circuit's approach
provides a better solution than the Ninth Circuit's approach.
V. CONCLUSION

On December 10, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of
Metro-Goldnyn-MayerStudios Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd.,"' setting the stage to answer the
question presented in the petitioners' brief:
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to longestablished principles of secondary liability in copyright law (and in
acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit), that the Interact-

175

See, e.g.,Jonathan Krim, Tech FirmsAim to Change CopyrightAct, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6,2005, at

El (noting that 7,700 lawsuits have been filed against file sharers).
176 See, e.g., Private CyberCopsNabCopyrightPirates,WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Dec. 2,2004 (noting
peer-to-peer copyright infringements from the Middle East, Russia, China and Singapore). Similar
problems can arise in contributory copyright infringement actions against the software providers if
they are located overseas, although the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction can
sometimes be satisfied. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (denying Vanuatu-based Sharman Networks
Ltd.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis of purposeful availment and
LEF Interactive Pty Ltd.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the grounds that
it was the corporate alter ego of Sharman).
177 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
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based "file sharing" services Grokster and StreamCast should be
immunized from copyright liability for the millions of daily acts of
copyright infringement that occur on their services and that
constitute at least 90% of the total use of the services.' 78
Not surprisingly, the Grokster defendants' brief frames the question more
delicately, asking "[w]hether the district court and Ninth Circuit correctly
concluded that Congress, rather than the courts, should decide whether and how
to reach new technoloto expand the scope of the statutory copyright monopoly
179
gies that have substantial noninfringing uses.'
The Supreme Court's decision to hear this case sets the stage for the Justices
to revisit Sony and decide on its continued viability in the light of the technological
developments of the past two decades. Most importantly, it presents them with
the opportunity to decide the proper role of noninfringing uses in contributory
copyright infringement claims against Internet services designed to allow the
software users to infringe copyrights in music and video. The Supreme Court
should reject the Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony and its treatment of
noninfringing uses as it makes contributory copyright liability too easy to
circumvent, provides ineffective safeguards to copyright holders, diverges too
sharply from the Sony holding, and forces the copyright industry to pursue an
inefficient litigation strategy against a multitude of copyright infringers rather than
focusing on the software providers who make those infringements possible.
The Seventh Circuit has developed a more well-reasoned approach to
contributory copyright infringement. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit approach
strikes a better balance between the rights of software providers and copyright
holders, comports better with the policy and language of the Sony holding, and
allows copyright holders to engage in a more efficient litigation strategy against
entities that are profiting from the underlying copyright infringements.
Respectfully, the Supreme Court would be well-advised to discard the Ninth
Circuit approach and adopt the Seventh Circuit approach as it decides the role of
Sony in the light of new digital technologies.

RICHARD M. MYRICK
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